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Abstract 
 
Within the theme issue focus on the growing divergence  between the “agriculture sector” and the 
“food sector” this paper focuses on how this changing divergence affects the political economy of 
agricultural and food policies. 
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1. Introduction  
Political economy models of agricultural and food policy often consider “producers”, 
“consumers”, and “taxpayers” as the main agents to study the impacts of policies, the political 
incentives, and the impact on policy outcomes (Anderson et al 2013).  One (theoretical) reason is its 
didactic use, i.e. to avoid unnecessary complications in deriving policy effects and identify equilibria.  
Another (empirical) reason is the absence of disaggregated information of policy impacts on various 
agents within (or outside) the value chain.   
It is, of course, well known that in reality many more agents are affected – and also play a role 
in lobbying governments to introduce or remove certain policies.  In agricultural and food policies 
“other agents” include input suppliers (such as land owners, seed and agro-chemical companies, and 
rural banks), traders, food processors, retail companies, etc.. These agents may be differently affected 
by policies, depending on the nature of the policy (eg whether the policy is targeted to the (raw) 
agricultural commodity or to a processed commodity) – or whether farm subsidies affect land or other 
production factors.  As a consequence, these different agents have sometimes joined forces (“political 
coalitions”) with farmers or with final consumers to influence policy makers in setting public policies.  
In this paper we discuss how structural changes in the agri-food value chains affects these 
(potential) coalitions and thus the political economy of agricultural and food policies.  There are 
several reasons why political coalitions may have changed over the past decades: the traditional 
power structures within value chains may have changed with some (sub)sectors growing and others 
declining with economic development, new technologies have brought new players into the value 
chains, new policy instruments have been introduced (or considered), etc.  As an illustration, consider 
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changed coalitions because of “new players” that have emerged, or because the same players are 
interested in “new things”.1 
 
New Kids on the Block 
New players have emerged for a variety of reasons. Awareness of environmental issues and 
the lobbying of environmental organizations has increased in recent decades. In the US the 1930s 
Dust Bowl already lead to the introduction of a major conservation payment program.  In the EU 
environmental concerns have been less important and environmental NGOs’ lobbying only had 
limited influence on agricultural and food policy in recent years. 
Technological advances, such as biotechnology and genetically manipulated (GM) crops, have 
created new vested interests – and changed these of others.  In the 1970s there was no pro- or anti- 
GM lobby since there was no GM. Biofuels have emerged as an important factor in agricultural 
markets and food policy with oil prices rising and with the search for renewable energy sources. 
The emergence of new policies, such as crop insurance subsidies, have brought new sectors, 
such as insurance companies, into to the lobbying game for farm support programs. Growing 
concentration in retail and the emergence of preferred supplier systems have made the retail sector a 
more powerful sector in the value chain. This may benefit consumers since for many agricultural 
policy issues consumer and retailer interests are aligned and their political coalition may be reinforced 
by growing retail concentration. 
 
Old Kids Fighting for New Things 
                                                 
1 An issue we do not cover is how the emergence of other factors and technologies outside the value chain affect 
policy-making related to agricultural and food policies.  One example is how the growth and technological change of 
commercial mass media has influenced agricultural and food policies (see e.g. McCluskey and Swinnen, 2011; Olper 
and Swinnen, 2013). 
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Consumer interests have changed.  Traditionally consumer interests were sufficient food 
availability and low food prices.  Over time, consumers have become more concerned with the safety 
and quality of their food, and with environmental and ethical standards of their food. Yet, the recent 
food price spikes and economic crisis have brought the cost of food back to the table as a major issue. 
With income growth and globalization interest in local products have taken on a new form.  
Consumers are interested in local foods, while farm groups see it as a potential way of marketing and 
protecting their products.  At the policy front this has e.g. resulted in regulations on geographical 
indications (GI) – an issue which has created tensions in trade negotiations. 
 
Outline of the paper. 
In this paper we will study some of these changing coalitions and their implications for public 
policy. The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief historical review of changes in 
the value chain. Section 3 discusses some conceptual issues related to how changes in value chains 
influence (changing) political coalitions and influence.  The rest of the sections present cases how 
changes in political coalitions in the value chains have affected agricultural and food policy in Europe 
and the USA in the 20th and 21st century.  The cases include historical changes in agricultural 
protection with changes in the relative strength of various actors (Sections 4 and 5); the growth of 
environmental interests (Section 6); how recent food price spikes and economic crises changed 
political coalitions (Section 7); the impact of changes in concentration in the value chains (Section 8) 
and of changes in consumer concerns in recent decades (Section 9); and the emergence of new players 
and policies in the agri food value chains, such as (bio-)technologies, biofuels and insurance 
industries (Section 10).   
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2. Structural Changes in Agricultural and Food Value Chains.  
Data to document the long run changes in the value chain are limited. For example there are 
no good indicators to measure the historical growth of agribusiness etc. We discuss here some key 
trends in the agri-food value chain using available indicators from Europe as illustration. 
In all European countries agriculture was a much more important share of the economy in the 
19th century than it is today. With the industrial revolution, agriculture’s share declined strongly, 
albeit with major differences between countries (see figure 1a). In the UK, where the industrial 
revolution started, agricultural employment had fallen to 20 % of total employment by 1880. On the 
continent, the shares were lowest in Belgium (less than 30 %) and the Netherlands (35 %). In contrast, 
farmers and farm workers still accounted for almost one-half of the population in France and 
Germany in 1880. By the 1960s, the employment share was close to 5 % in the UK and Belgium and 
around 10 % in the Netherlands, Sweden and in Western Germany, as the more agricultural part of the 
country was separated into East Germany. Only France still had a much larger share of its population 
in agriculture (around 20 %).  
Everywhere and always the contribution of agriculture to economic output was lower than its 
share in employment (figure 1b). By the late 19th century the share of agriculture in GDP had fallen to 
around 10 % in Belgium and the UK while it was around a quarter of total output in France and 
around a third in Germany. By the 1960s these shares had fallen to around 6 % or less in all these 
countries.  The declining share of agriculture has continued and that there has been a convergence to 
low levels among European countries. The shares in employment have fallen to less than 5 %.  
Agriculture’s contribution to GDP is even less: in the richest countries it is now below 2 % -- a trend 
which was referred to by Peter Timmer (2009) as towards “A World Without Agriculture”. 
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The share of food in consumer expenditures obviously also reduced substantially. Food 
expenditures remained a very large share of total consumer expenditures well into the 20th century in 
several countries (figure 2). However, these aggregate figures hide the fact that there were major 
differences among groups in society, with the poorest spending much more on food and major 
changes within the broad category of ‘food’ consumption. For example, in Belgium the share of staple 
foods, such as bread and potatoes, declined from around 40 per cent of total expenditures in 1850 to 
around 10 per cent by 1920, despite that the aggregate share of food expenditures remained almost 
constant over this period (at 60 per cent (Swinnen et al. 2000)). The food shares declined particularly 
fast in the decades after the Second World War as incomes increased rapidly in Europe.  
 As the share of food in consumer expenditures continued to decline, the share of “consumer 
food expenditures” that goes to “agriculture” has declined even more with economic development.  
Processing, packaging, marketing and retailing of food are taking up a growing share. Today, the cost 
of agricultural ingredients is only a small share of the price of the final food products: in the EU it is 
merely 5 percent of the cost of bread, just 20 percent for meat and livestock products (European 
Commission 2007).  Moreover, health, quality, environmental and ethical attributes of food 
consumption have become increasingly important (see further). 
Data on food manufacturing and retail are only available for the more recent period (see figures 
3). Employment and GDP shares of food manufacturing are in the 1.5 % to 2.5% interval, not so 
different from those of agriculture. The shares have also been falling since 1975, albeit at slower rates 
than for agriculture.  The retail sector is considerably larger with around 4% of GDP and 8% of 
employment, but these numbers include also non-food retailing. The shares have been relatively 
stable over the past two decades. 
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Simultaneously, within the agricultural sector, specialization, technology and factor use 
changed. Agricultural production became increasingly capital intensive and depending on external 
inputs.  Capital intensity increased particularly in the 1950s and 1960s.  With the growing importance 
of food processing and retailing on the downstream side of the value chain, the increased use of 
external inputs increased the importance (and the economic interests) of various industries that 
supplied inputs (including capital) to farmers in the upstream segment of the value chain.   With new 
technologies emerging, new interests have been created.   
Not only has the share of non-farm economic activities in the agri-food value chain increased, 
the structure of these segments is quite different from agricultural production.  In most European 
countries family farms dominate, and even in countries where there are many large farms (UK, 
Germany, Slovakia, etc) the concentration is much less than in most other segments of the chain.   
Moreover, concentration has generally increased in the food supply chain outside the farmer 
and (final) consumer segments. Consolidation in food processing and retailing companies occurred 
through natural growth as well as through mergers and acquisitions.  Large food and retail companies 
are also increasingly spreading globally, through foreign direct investments.  Especially the retail 
sector has concentrated in recent years, more than the food manufacturing/processing sector.  In fact, 
in reports from the 1970s, there was mostly concern about the high concentration and monopoly 
power in the food manufacturing sector and the weak bargaining position of the small retail 
companies. Until the 1970s, food retailing was a largely fragmented sector. For example, the leading 
5 firms controlled only 8-9% of national retail goods sales in the UK in 1961 and it has only slightly 
increased to 14.4% by 1982. The real wave of consolidation of the retail sector in the US and EU 
largely took place in the 1990s.  In the US, the combined market share of the four largest grocery 
retailers increased from 14% in 1984 over 22% in 1994 to 55 % in 2001 (Swinnen and Vandeplas, 
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2010).  Concentration has continued in the past decade. In some countries in Europe, the market share 
of the largest five food retailers (i.e. the C-5 concentration ratios) is over 80% (European Commission 
2014). 
 
3. Some Conceptual Issues  
Several factors play a role in how (changes in) the divergence between “agriculture” and “the 
food industry” and other agents in the value chain affect the political economy of agricultural and 
food policies. Three key aspects are: (1) the nature of the policies, (2) the costs of collective action, 
and (3) how structural changes affect incentives for political action.  
 
The Nature of Policies and Coalitions in the Value Chain  
The nature of public policies influences the structure of the political game by determining the 
possible coalitions – and vice versa. Consider a simple value chain as illustrated in Box 1.  While this 
value chain is more elaborate than the producer-consumer dichotomy, it still ignores many potential 
other value chain issues, such as competition between feed and food (and thus livestock versus crops), 
between food and fuel use, “environmental interests”, etc. Yet, despite its simplicity it is useful to 
illustrate potential coalitions. 
Agricultural and food policies typically intervene in specific parts of the value chain.  The type 
of instrument used and the “location” of intervention has a major impact on the possible political 
coalitions. The nature of the policy instrument will determine whether the interests of farmers and 
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processors or other agents are aligned or not (i.e. whether they have opposing or conflicting interests 
in setting public policy interventions).2  
Consider trade and price interventions, such as import tariffs and price support measures, 
which have long been the dominant way of supporting farmers in European agriculture. The use of 
tariffs goes back centuries.  Price support measures, combined with variable import tariffs and export 
subsidies, were the main component of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy in the 1970s and 
1980s.   
 Import tariffs may differ strongly between processed food products (e.g. pasta or specific 
cheeses) and agricultural products (e.g. cereals or milk). In case import tariff and price interventions 
are at the level of the agricultural commodities, the food processors (buyers of cereals or milk) may 
have opposing interests to the farmers, since they are “the consumers” – even if they can pass part of 
the increased costs on to “final consumers”.  However, “agricultural policies” (such as tariffs, import 
quota, or price interventions) often do not apply to the raw agricultural products as they are sold by 
the farmers, but to products which have undergone a certain level of processing or marketing.  For 
example, it is typically not the raw milk or the sugar beets that are traded or purchased by government 
agencies but processed products such as milk powder, cheese or sugar. Hence, interests of food 
processing companies involved in early stage processing will often be aligned with these of farmers, 
while those of further processing may be opposite.  Take the case of sugar: the “production side” 
includes sugar processing companies and the farmers producing sugar cane or sugar beet (and other 
agents, such as land owners and agribusinesses supplying inputs to the farmers).  The “consumer 
side” also includes food companies.  Some sugar is “consumed” directly by households, but most is 
sold to the food industry, which uses the sugar in various products sold to retailers and only then 
                                                 
2 Not surprisingly, this makes the choice of the policy instrument the subject of lobbying itself. In this paper we do not 
explicitly analyse this issue. For studies on the endogeneity of instrument choice in agricultural and food policy, see 
e.g. Swinnen et al. (2012) and references there in. 
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households consume the sugar. This separation is well illustrated by the current debate on the ending 
of the sugar production quotas in the EU.  The EU’s beverage and confection industries and sweetener 
companies have lined up to lobby the EU decision-makers against the extension of the EU sugar 
quota; while the sugar producing companies are lobbying in favour. 
This does not only apply to policies downstream in the value chain but also to upstream 
policies.  For example, regulations which affect input prices (such as fertilizer subsidies or land 
regulations) may involve very different political coalitions than policies where there are important 
leakages to (benefits for) the owners or producers of farm inputs (such as price support or direct 
payments which increase land prices).  In some of these regulations, interests of input suppliers and 
farmers will be aligned, in others they will conflict.  
For example, landowners and farmers have always had a complex relationship.  In countries 
where farms own most of their land, their interest coincide.  However, in many parts of the world 
farmers rent a considerable part of their land – and there have been considerable changes on this 
through history (Swinnen et al., 2014). In Europe, a hundred years ago land was at the centre of 
agricultural policy reflecting major economic and political conflicts between landowners and farmers. 
At the end of the 19th century and early 20th century landowners and tenant farmers fought over land 
rental conditions. These conflicts resulted in a series of land regulations (and taxes)  (Swinnen, 2000). 
In recent decades landowners and farmers have joined forces in lobbying for agricultural subsidies. 
Farm subsidies, either linked to production or to land use, have spilled over into high land prices and 
rents creating a coalition between farmers and landowners. In recent EU policy discussions, 
landowners have not opposed moving from trade-distorting price support and land payments towards 
non-trade-distorting decoupled farm payments, since the payments are still linked to land use and thus 
keep land prices high (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Ciaian et al., 2013). 
11 
 
 
Effectiveness of Collective Action.  
Obviously if there is a change in the coalition structure by agents switching sides, or new 
agents joining, this could change the political equilibrium. But changes in coalitions, or in the 
structure or organization of current coalition members could have non-linear effect if they would lead 
to more (or less) effective political activities. 
One key element is the size, concentration and wealth of vested interests (reflected in the 
number and wealth of agents) and how this affects their influence in the political process through 
Mancur Olson’s (1965) “logic of collective action”. Olson’s insights have been widely applied in 
studying the political economy of agricultural and food policies (Anderson et al. 2013). In order to 
effectively influence political choices, interest-group members must act in unison. They must form an 
organization that can mobilize resources and direct individual action. The greater the number of 
politically active members in an organization and the more resources at its disposal, the greater will 
be its political power base. However, as Olson argues (1965), individuals in the group often prefer to 
free ride.  
Factors contributing to lower costs of political organizational and better control of free riding 
all enhance the group’s political power. Geographic concentration of group members, a strong 
commitment to a broadly shared ideology, and low communication costs (which can result from 
members’ organized activities, such as trade and professional associations) contribute to cohesiveness 
within the interest group and decrease the organizational set-up and maintenance costs. Such forces 
strengthen the group’s political power. 
This collective-action theory predicts changes in the political equilibration overtime. In poor 
countries food consumers are often concentrated in cities with lower political action–coordination and 
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enforcement costs relative to farmers, who are dispersed in rural areas. However, as the economy 
develops, and especially, as the share of agriculture in employment declines and rural infrastructure 
improves, the cost of political organization for farmers decreases. This cost reduction is likely to 
increase the effectiveness of farmers’ representation of their interests and, as a consequence, of their 
lobbying activities3. 
Researchers debate whether changes in relative collective-action costs for farmers alone can 
explain major changes in agricultural policies. Although rural infrastructure and information have 
improved significantly as countries have developed, even in developed countries, there remain a very 
large number of farmers (de Gorter and Swinnen 2002). The persistence of such large numbers of 
farmers, whose interests are not necessarily aligned, might imply that collective-action obstacles still 
exist.  
However, other agents in the value chain, such as food processing and retail companies and 
agribusinesses tend to be less fragmented and more capitalized than the farms. So they may be more 
effective in organizing for political action. Hence coalition-formation may have important effects. 
 
Structural Change, Political Incentives and Policy Costs 
Structural changes in the value chains may influence the political equilibrium through 
inducing changes in political incentives (on the demand and supply side).  Many agricultural and food 
policies are designed to alter the “without-policy” income distribution.  Growth and decline of 
specific sectors (e.g. with economic development) affects the inter-sectoral distribution of income. 
                                                 
3 The nature of agricultural structures also may determine the effectiveness of collective political action, but there may 
be offsetting effects. Traditional arguments predict that a sector with mainly large-holding farmers can more easily 
overcome collective action problems because its members are typically fewer and its collective-action costs lower 
compared to the political rents they receive. However La Ferrara (2002) argues that inequality among farmers may 
make it harder for collective action to succeed because small and large farmers have conflicting incentives and 
because free riding is likely to be more common in a heterogeneous group setting. Historical evidence from Europe 
also supports this result (Schonhardt-Bailey 2006; Swinnen 2009).  
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This process creates political incentives—both on the demand (e.g. farmers’) side and the supply 
(politicians’) side—to exchange government transfers for political support. When farm incomes 
decline relative to other sectors, farmers will look for non-market sources of income, such as 
government support, either because the return to investment is greater from (political) lobbying 
activities than from (economic) production, or because the willingness to support politicians grows as 
the political rents that are generated increase.4  
Structural change also affects the costs and benefits of policies (Anderson 1995; Swinnen 
1994). For example, when consumers spend a large share of their income on food, the per capita costs 
of agricultural price support is proportionately much higher than when consumers spent much less of 
their income on food.  Vice versa, for a given costs for consumers, farmers benefit more when there 
are fewer farmers – concentrating the benefits. The per unit political cost of subsidizing farms thus 
decreases as the economy becomes richer and less agrarian. Even though the share of farmers in the 
voting population declines, there is less opposition to protecting them. De Gorter and Swinnen (1993) 
have shown that under plausible assumptions, the second of those two effects dominates. 
 
4. Political Coalitions and Agricultural Protection in Europe5 
The importance of political coalitions in value chains can be seen from when they are effective 
and when they are not. History provides many examples. Here I summarize a few to illustrate key 
insights. 
 
                                                 
4 The nature of the mechanism through which these changing political incentives operate has been modeled in various 
ways. For example, Swinnen (1994) has used a politician-voter interaction model, in which differences in marginal 
utility drive the result. Others, such as Freund and Özden (2008) and Tovar (2009), focus on the importance of 
aversion to loss in determining political reactions in order to explain why declining sectors, such as agriculture, 
receive support.  That work builds on the earlier notions of a conservative social welfare function (Corden 1997) and 
of senescent industry support (Hillman 1982). 
5 This section draws on Swinnen (2009), which has more details. 
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Policy Reactions to the Agricultural Crisis of the End of the 19th Century 
The often heralded period of free trade in the 19th century comes to an end when cheap grain 
imports hit the West European markets after 1875.6 Western Europe grain prices fell by almost 50 per 
cent over the period 1880–95. The dramatic changes in the agricultural markets induced strong 
pressure from farmers on governments to intervene. Reactions of governments in Europe differ. The 
governments of France and Germany introduced import tariffs to protect their grain farms. In contrast, 
countries such as the UK and Belgium (as well as the Netherlands and Finland) did not impose import 
tariffs for grain.  
The difference in policy response reflected different political coalitions. France and Germany 
were characterised by a large agricultural population, little industrialization,  and an important crop 
sector. In France, crops made up more than 70 per cent of total agricultural production during the 19th 
century. Belgium and the UK were already quite industrialised by the time of the agricultural crisis. In 
both countries a coalition of workers and industrial capital opposed tariffs because they benefited 
from low food prices (and thus low wages) with cheap grain imports. While the UK landlords had 
always been very powerful (e.g. through the representation system in parliament) their influence was 
waning and they were now confronted with a strong opposition of labour and industrial capital, who 
had gained increasing political power.  
In addition, many ‘agricultural interests’ did not support import tariffs. The main group hurt by 
the low grain prices were large landlords, mostly located in the southern regions of England. 
However, many of the other actors in agriculture actually favoured low grain prices. Livestock 
                                                 
 
6 The sharp reduction in European grain prices was due to a dramatic increase in imports from Canada, the United 
States, Argentina and Russia. There are two reasons for this. First, there was a major expansion of agricultural 
production, especially in the United States where land was abundant and cheap. Second, technological innovations 
dramatically decreased production costs, both through agricultural machinery which allowed for the exploitation of 
vast areas, and through transport prices, as the steam engine allowed much cheaper transport via trains and the steam 
boat.   
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farmers, mostly located in the northern part of the country, benefited through low feed prices. The 
English landlords were not even supported in their demand for protection by those who worked on 
their farms. Farm workers were very poor and they benefited more from low prices of staple food 
(grains) than they lost from the negative pressure on their wages, which were strongly influenced by 
industrial wages. 
Moreover, in feudal systems such as the UK, small farms and tenants were more concerned 
with their tenure rights than with import tariffs at the end of the 19th and early 20th century. They saw 
landlords and large grain farms as their main problem, not cheap imports. Their political struggle 
focused on improving tenure conditions by opposing landlords, rather than forming a coalition with 
them to increase farm prices (Cannadine, 1992; Swinnen, 2000). 
In Belgium, the coalition against grain tariffs included other agents from the value chain. 
Import tariffs on oats were opposed by the transport industry and the coal mines, where horse power 
was important. Tariffs on barley were opposed by the brewing industry. This coalition prevented 
protection against barley imports, although oats tariffs were later introduced as a compromise, with 
more farmers producing oats and no opposition from brewers (Swinnen et al 2001). An additional 
vested interest was the Antwerp harbour, an important employer and opposed to any tariffs that would 
limit the trade volume.  
 
Growing Agricultural Protection after World War II 
Agricultural protection increased with the political organisation of farms. While landlords and 
large farms were already politically powerful in the 19th century, many new farm organisations, in 
particular representing small farmers, emerged during the crisis, and a network of rural organisations 
grew in importance. In addition, voting rights are extended to small farmers and farm workers in the 
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beginning of the 20th century in many European countries. These factors had relatively limited impact 
on the protection debate at the end of the 19th century because by the time the organisations were 
working effectively and small farmers and workers had voting rights, the agricultural crisis had 
subsided and World War I had started.   However these political developments did enhance the 
influence of farmers later in the 20th century. 
From the 1950s onwards, farmers’ incomes fell behind incomes outside the agricultural sector. 
Economic growth was strong in the rest of the economy and the income gap between farmers and 
people working in other sectors increased strongly. The relative income situation of farmers became a 
central issue in agricultural policy. Farmers pressured European governments to intervene in the 
market to correct these growing income gaps by supporting farm incomes.  
This led to a series of government interventions in European agriculture in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Minimum prices, import tariffs and quotas, etc. were introduced and became the building blocks on 
which the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was constructed. The introduction of high 
guaranteed prices in the CAP resulted in large trade distortions in the 1970s and 1980s. This lead to 
so-called “wine lakes” and “butter mountains”, a budget crisis and to increasing tensions with trading 
partners in the world market (Josling, 2010). 
The growth of agricultural protection was associated with the growth of cooperative 
agribusiness and food-processing companies. The growth and concentration of agribusinesses and 
food-processing companies created a strong political coalition with farm interests in lobbying for 
agricultural policies (Anderson 1995).7 Since farm lobbies and agribusiness interests were 
                                                 
7 Gawande and Hoekman (2006) and López (2008) also find a significant influence of agribusiness and food 
companies’ political contributions on US agricultural policies. 
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increasingly well capitalized and concentrated, they became an important force in orchestrating public 
policies that benefited their interests.8  
Consumer interests also changed. As incomes grew and value chains became longer with more 
processed products, consumers became less sensitive to policies affecting agricultural prices. 
Moreover, on a continent twice devastated in a fifty-year period and twice facing food shortages 
during war times the argument of sufficient food through local production touched a nerve among 
consumers. Politicians who had to address the nation’s basic concerns and consumers who faced 
hunger and food shortages during times when food imports and long-distance food supplies were 
interrupted were sympathetic to the call for supporting domestic food production.  
In summary, after the Second World War, all factors in favour of agricultural protection and 
more farm support to agriculture came together. Most importantly, opposition of industry and workers 
in the rest of the economy declined. With strong growth in the rest of the economy, the share of food 
in total consumer expenditures and its impact on wages declined strongly and with this so did 
opposition to protection from workers and industry. At the same time, farm incomes fell increasingly 
behind incomes in the rest of the economy, increasing demands for agricultural support. Farm 
demands were now politically influential since political organisations of farms were well established 
and because of their votes. In addition, farm-related cooperatives and business organisations in the 
agri-food sector became important interest groups, with, for example, agricultural credit cooperatives, 
dairy and sugar processing companies joining farm unions in actively lobbying for government 
support and import protection for their sectors. The combination of these factors caused an important 
and structural shift of the political coalitions, and the policy equilibrium, towards more protection – 
resulting in high levels of government intervention and support to agriculture in the decades following 
                                                 
8 Francois et al (2008) and Cadot et al (2004) show that protection escalates with the degree of processing. 
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the Second World War, as is illustrated in figure 4 (with the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture 
(NRA) measuring the level of protection). 
 
5. New Coalitions and CAP Reform in the EU 
The 2003 CAP reform under Commissioner Franz Fischler is by many experts identified as the 
most radical reform in CAP history. Others see it as the culmination of three decades of reforms. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, pressure increased on EU policymakers to reduce the CAP distortions. 
The EU had previously been a major net importer of agricultural and food products, but the CAP 
caused a strong reduction in imports and growth of subsidized exports. The most important outside 
pressure came from exporting nations such as the US and Australia, and from developing countries 
and international organizations that accused the EU of causing poverty and hunger in poor rural 
households.9 Pressure came also from inside the EU, primarily from ministers of finance concerned 
about the cost of subsidies (Josling 2008; Moehler 2008).  
The first reforms came in the mid 1980s with the introduction of production quotas in the 
sugar and dairy sectors. These quotas limited the size of subsidies and surpluses, but most production 
was still subsidized and a substantial amount was still exported with subsidies. In the early 1990s 
price support and export subsidies were replaced by payments based on the area of land under 
cultivation, the so-called “direct payments”. These reforms were strongly influenced by the GATT10 
negotiations and made the “Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture” (URAA) possible. The 
                                                 
9 For example, organizations such as the OECD and the World Bank emphasized how the EU (and other countries 
including the U.S.) were hurting the poor by contributing to low agricultural and food prices through their agricultural 
subsidies. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) took the same position.  See Swinnen (2011) for details.  
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
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reforms were reinforced by the so-called Agenda 2000 reforms in 1999 to allow the expansion of the 
CAP to the new Eastern European member states in 2004. 
Despite their reforms, there were growing demands for further, and radical changes. Several 
factors came together in the period around 2002, creating what I called a “perfect storm”:  strong 
demand for radical changes in the CAP and sufficient pressure to overcome opposition (Swinnen 
2008).  
Then-EU Commissioner Fischler argued that “the CAP had lost its legitimacy among the EU 
public” around 2000. The CAP was  seen as hurting EU trade interests, as it had been a major 
stumbling block in trade negotiations.11 In addition, there were increasing concerns about the negative 
effects of agriculture on the environment and the climate, and when several food safety and animal 
welfare crises hit the EU in the late 1990s (see above), the CAP not only appeared to be ineffective in 
addressing the problems and the food safety concerns of EU consumers, but instead to worsen the 
situation. Hence, when Ministers of Finance were searching for budget cuts the CAP immediate came 
into focus.  
In response, Commissioner Fischler and his team designed a strategy to maintain support for 
European agriculture by creating a new political coalition for the CAP by addressing trade, 
environmental and food safety concerns. The first key element of the reform was to eliminate or 
strongly reduce the distortions caused by the CAP on international markets – thereby addressing the 
trade concerns. The proposal was to fully “decouple” farm payments through a “single farm 
payments” (SFP) system.  Subsidies would no longer be related (“coupled”) to what was produced, 
but farmers were given a fixed payment. To address environmental concerns, these payments would 
                                                 
11 The EU expected that further cuts in agricultural subsidies would be needed in the next WTO round. 
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be conditional on farmers addressing certain environmental conditions, such as preventing soil 
erosion, managing water and avoiding the deterioration of habitats – the so-called “cross-compliance” 
requirements. The third component, food safety concerns, were addressed in a separate policy (see 
further). 
 The 2003 negotiations transformed the politics-as-usual of the CAP. Traditionally, the main 
pressure group had been the farm unions. Now environmental (and consumer) groups played a more 
prominent role in the CAP reform debate than previously. The combined reforms resulted in a strong 
decline in EU subsidies affecting production and trade. Figure 4 illustrates how the NRA fell strongly 
over the past two decades: from on average more than 50 percent in 1991–95 to just 11 percent in 
2005–10.12  
Some argued that farm unions were less influential. Others argued that the farm organizations 
understood that they needed this new coaltion to solve the CAP subsidies. In fact, with Fischler’s 
coaltion, more severe budget cuts were avoided. While the reduction in coupled farm support has 
been strong, from the mid 2000s onwards the vast majority of EU farm support remained at more than 
50 billion euros per year, of which 35 billion euros were given as decoupled direct payments.  From 
this perspective, the Fischler reforms contributed to the survival of the CAP payments, rather than to 
their demise.  
 
6.  Environmental Concerns 
 As we explained in section 5, the 2003 reforms brought environmental organizations as a 
major player into the agricultural policy discussions in the EU. This was much later than in the USA. 
                                                 
12 Similar conclusions come from OECD estimates on agricultural support in the EU.. 
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However, in both countries the food price spikes in the late 2000s seem to have limited growth of 
their influence.  
 
Conservation Payments in the US 
Conservation has a long history in U.S. agricultural policy dating back to the Dust Bowl era of the 
1930s.  Environmental concerns took on new prominence in the 1985 and 1990 Farm Bill: the latter 
was entitled the “Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act.” Farm groups seeking to limit 
agricultural production—thereby raising prices—joined a political coalition with environmentalists to 
establish a Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) for the protection of erodible land. Farmers can 
place their land in the CRP in exchange for CRP payments. In 2012, 27 million acres of U.S. 
cropland, involving nearly 400,000 farms, were in the CRP (USDA 2013).  
The latest negotiations on the 2014 Farm Bill do not show an increased influence of 
environmental interests. The budget for CRP payments has been relatively constant over the past 
decade and is not planned to change significantly. In fact, with higher commodity prices after 2005, 
CRP payments have become less competitive, and fewer farmers are interested in CRP (Cuellar et al., 
2014).  
 
Greening Farm Payments in the EU 
A decade after the 2003 Fishler CAP reforms, hopes were high among the environmental 
organizations that, given the need to address climate change and other environmental concerns, 
important further changes could be made in the 2013 CAP reform to enhance the environmental 
impact of CAP payments for the 2013-2020 period. Policy discussions focused on how to reform the 
farm payments, as increased pressure from taxpayers and demands from environmental groups 
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challenge the current payment structures. The Commission proposed to maintain the key elements of 
the CAP as they existed at the time, but with changes in the nature, structure and distribution of the 
payments. One key element was greening of the payments as farm support would be  better linked to 
environmental objectives. 
Farm organizations lobbied to secure the payments. They were supported in these efforts by 
landowners, who are benefiting from spillover effects of the land-based payments (Ciaian et al., 
2013). Farm associations formed a strategic coalition with environmental groups to lobby the 
Ministers of Finance and Heads of the EU member states for as a large a CAP budget as possible 
during the economic and financial crisis – much like the 2003 reforms. However, as soon as the 
budget for the 2014-2020 CAP was fixed (in early 2013), farm groups started lobbying to remove or 
weaken environmental constraints on the payments (Hart, 2015; Matthews, 2015). 
Farm organizations targeted the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament (EP) as a 
key focus for lobbying activities. The EP was for the first time involved in the actual CAP decision-
making. The Agricultural Committee of the EP, where the key positions were prepared, included 
many members who are linked to traditional agricultural interests.  
The EP and the council of Ministers both introduced significant amendments to the 
environmental conditions in the Commission reform proposals. In the end, environmentalists were 
very disappointed with an outcome which some have described as a “green wash” instead of 
“greening” (Erjavec et al, 2015; Hart 2015). 
 
7.  Food Price Spikes, Economic Crises and Public Policy in the 21st century  
A crucial factor in the successful lobbying of farmers in the EU against more environmental 
constraints and the fall in interest of US farmers in the CRP are the rising agricultural and food prices 
in the late 2000s.  The rising food prices caused concern among poor consumers, many who were 
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already suffering from the most severe economic crisis since the 1930s.  Producing and securing food 
suddenly re-emerged as an important policy concern.  Environmental concerns gave way to food 
security and production objectives.  
Hence, somewhat paradoxically, after the EU had gone through decades of reforms to reduce 
the negative (downward) impact of the CAP on global food prices downward, the world became 
concerned with food prices heading in the other direction. After the price spikes of 2007–08, 
international organizations, NGOs and many experts pointed at the hunger and poverty effects of high 
food prices (Swinnen and Squicciarini, 2012).  
Policy reactions took on a different form in the EU than in the USA because of the nature of 
the welfare system. In Europe, government support for poor consumers in the EU now occurs mostly 
through social spending, not through food market regulations. Social groups that are particularly 
vulnerable to food costs, such as the elderly, the unemployed and the poor, can draw on social 
security resources.  
Average consumer prices in the EU increased just slightly over the 2005–12 period, with real 
food prices only 5 percent higher in 2012 than in 2005. With  European consumers spending on 
average 15 percent of their household budget on food, food price changes therefore had a limited 
impact on the average EU households’ overall welfare. However, there are significant differences in 
the EU: the share of the household budget spent on food varies from 10 percent in the UK to more 
than 40 percent in Romania.  
Unlike CAP subsidies, social policies, such as unemployment benefits, pensions and disability 
payments, are still the responsibility of individual member states. The increase in food prices induced 
pressure from consumers, in particular the poorest, to increase social spending. Increases in other 
prices, such as those for energy and transport, reinforced this pressure. Even as the financial and 
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economic crisis constrained governments’ budgets, social expenditures in the EU increased by 
approximately 7 percent between 2005 and 2010. Not surprisingly, there are large disparities among 
member states, but spending on social security benefits increased in almost all of them (Swinnen et 
al., 2013).  
 
Food Stamps and the Farm Bill in the USA 13 
The coalition between consumers and producers interest in agricultural policy is much more 
elaborate in the US. The Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP, also known as “food 
stamps”) is a major item of the US’s “agricultural policy”, often referred to as the “Farm Bill”. SNAP 
payments go to families with net-incomes less than the poverty line. In 2012, some 47 million 
Americans—about 15% of the entire nation—received SNAP payments, and the $112 billion 
consumer package is now the core of USDA’s budget.  
 This huge safety-net consumer program is located within the USDA’s budget rather than 
within the Department of Health and Human Services, the home for virtually all other welfare 
programs, for historical and political reasons (Cuellar et al., 2014). The food stamp program was 
originally designed to distribute surplus agricultural commodities to assist poor and needy families in 
the 1930s and later became a part of President Kennedy’s “War on Poverty”. Because the 1930s food 
stamp program was within the USDA, due to strong links with agricultural political interests, it 
remained there. Yet, the current growth is due to what Cuellar et al. (2014) claim is “arguably the 
most prominent example of coalition politics in American food and agriculture policy”, i.e. the 
cooperative dynamic between supporters of domestic nutrition assistance and supporters of domestic 
farm subsidies to pass the Farm Bill.  This entails an informal understanding whereby members of 
                                                 
13 This section draws on Cueller et al. (2014). 
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Congress who support domestic nutrition assistance either vote in favor of, or remain silent on, 
proposals to subsidize farmers, as long as domestic nutrition assistance programs are also funded 
adequately. In order to ensure the passage of a bill on either farm subsidies or nutritional assistance, 
both must be included in the same legislation. The Farm Bill is thus an omnibus piece of legislation 
requiring the support of both sides. What makes this piece of legislation particularly interesting is that 
the provision of nutritional assistance provides a safety net for low-income consumers, particularly in 
times of high or volatile food prices caused in part by agricultural policies like the corn-ethanol 
program. The convergence of special interests creates a peculiar equilibrium in U.S. food and 
agricultural policy that is extremely difficult to disrupt. 
The recent growth of SNAP payments is related to several factors.  First, while the U.S. is a 
rich country, there are many poor people in the U.S., especially among  minority groups. Second, the 
SNAP program is designed to be counter-cyclical with respect to growth in the U.S. economy. 
Between 2007 and 2012, U.S. unemployment rates rose from 4.6% to 8.1%, one reason why SNAP 
expenditures rose strongly. Third, rising food prices after 2007 were translated into additional costs 
for the SNAP program. 
Not surprisingly, the large size of the current food stamp program made the traditional farm 
constituencies nervous and threatened the rural-urban political coalition that had been necessary to 
pass farm bills. In recent years, the need to reduce fiscal deficits limited the amount of money that 
could be spent through the Farm Bill, placing stress on “the grand coalition”.  It encouraged the two 
sides to seek the best deal they could get individually. As a result, in 2013 the US Congress was 
unable to pass legislation reauthorizing the Farm Bill. After a crisis however, the two sides came 
together again and joined forces in passing a new Farm Bill in 2014.  
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8. Changes in Market Power and Policies 
How did the changes in concentration in value chains affect policy? Market power in food 
supply chains has emerged as an important economic issue and a highly sensitive item on the policy 
agenda all around the world. A typical example is the Polish government’s claim that “Food retailers 
in Europe have largely failed to pass on market price reductions to consumers, keeping their margins 
high and causing many farmers to abandon agriculture because of poor incomes” (forexpros.com, 
May 25, 2009). Similar claims that large, often multinational, retailers and food companies are 
depressing prices because of their market power have been made in many countries around the world.  
However, the impact on policy itself  is not obvious. There are several factors at play. To start, 
an important factor is that increases in concentration are not necessarily an indication of distortions 
warranting public policy corrections. Increased concentration may lead to market power but also to 
efficiency gains with scale economies, reduced transaction costs and enhanced bargaining power in 
value chains. These arguments have been raised by the retail sector, and by economists and legal 
scholars analyzing competition issues.14 
Empirical evidence on buyer power is weaker than one may suspect. Sexton et al. (2006) 
mention that it is practically impossible to measure the retailers’ buying power, as prices paid by 
retailers to their suppliers are “typically not revealed”. Dobson et al. (2001) fail to find clear evidence 
of abuse of market power vis-à-vis farmers. The UK Competition Commission in 2000 reviewed 
complaints by farmers’ organizations that supermarket chains pay very low prices for farm products, 
but fail to pass low prices on to consumers and concluded that the low producer prices were mainly a 
                                                 
14 See Swinnen and Vandeplas (2010) for a review. 
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result of excess supply, and had been passed on to consumers, or were compensated by other cost 
increases. 
Another factor is that consumers, and in particular low income consumers, despite growing 
concentration, appear to benefit from retail competition. The 2004 enlargement of the European 
Union with poorer Eastern member states also provides an illustration of the benefits from retail 
competition. Increased competition in the retail sector is argued to be one of the main reasons why 
consumer food prices increased less than predicted with EU accession in the new member states. In 
2014, the EU Commission published a communication in which it stated that it does not foresee 
regulatory action at EU level and does not prescribe a single solution to address the issue of unfair 
trading practices in food supply chains, but rather encourages operators in the European food supply 
chain to participate in voluntary schemes, like the Supply Chain Initiative.15 
Other factors that have refrained the EU from more market regulations are probably the the 
fact that a return to price interventions would imply a major turnaround in 20 years of reforms of the 
CAP, which has gradually shifted from price and trade regulations to direct payments to support farm 
incomes. There is little evidence that more powerful retailers played an important role in this policy 
shift, but it would be consistent with their interests (since it reduces the costs of their supplies), and 
increased power. 
However, the retail sector did play a very important role – and interacted intensively with EU 
policy-makers on regulations and standards on food products – the third component of the 2003 
Fischler reforms and a major political item since. 
                                                 
15 Concerns on abuse of market power and unfair practices in the food supply chain emerged during the food crisis in 
2008. The Commission establishment the High Level Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain, which 
includes different stakeholders from the food supply chain.  The Forum agreed on a set of principles of good practices 
in vertical relationships and launched a voluntary framework for implementing the principles of good practice (the 
Supply Chain Initiative). 
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9. Food Safety and Quality Concerns 
EU consumers in the 21st century are arguably more concerned about the safety and quality of 
food than about food prices. These safety concerns were very clear during the food scares that plagued 
the EU in the second half of the 1990s, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or “mad 
cow disease”), food and mouth disease (FMD) and episodes of toxic contamination, including the 
dioxin crises (Bernauer 2003; Scholderer 2005).   
Following the food safety crises in the 1990s, particularly the emergence of BSE in 1996 and 
the dioxin contamination crisis in 1998, the European Commission launched a new food safety 
initiative. This resulted in major legislative changes such as the Basic Food Law Regulation, 
including the creation of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The main goal of the new food 
safety policies was to protect consumer health by the introduction of a farm-to-fork safety approach, 
imposing strict traceability requirements throughout EU food chains.  Not only has the public sector 
responded to the crises, but there has also been a rapid growth in private sector initiatives in the field 
of food safety and quality standards. These include the GlobalGAP16 standard which is now used by a 
large number of the major retailers in the EU (and the world) (Fulponi, 2007).  
While it is uncertain to what extent growing market power by food retailers and processors 
affected traditional agricultural policies (e.g. the CAP) it is very clear that consumers’ quality and 
safety concerns triggered strong reactions from the food processors and retailers. This included both 
the introduction of private standards to address concerns that were/are not addressed by public 
regulations, the pre-empting of public regulations by private standards, and their lobbying to influence 
                                                 
16  GlobalGAP is a certification scheme with guidelines for the "Good Agricultural Production" of fresh fruits and 
vegetables.  
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the nature of public food regulations (McCluskey and Winfree, 2006; Vandemoortele and Deconinck, 
2014). 
The growth and spread of these food standards has triggered a strong debate in trade policy on 
the extent to which these standards are new protectionist instruments, i.o. so-called non-tariff 
measures (NTMs, when the use of tariffs is restricted by the WTO (Beghin, 2013); and in 
development policy about the potential detrimental effects of these standards on poor farmers in 
developing countries which risk to be marginalized (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Reardon et al., 
2003). Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2009, 2012) show that the political coalitions in the public food 
standards setting can create “under-standardization” and “over-standardization” as political equilibria, 
depending on external conditions. In a review of these issues, Beghin et al. (2015) conclude that the 
impact on trade and development are complex and often case-specific. 
 
10.  New Players and Policies in Agri-Food Value Chains  
GM Regulations 
One of the most controversial recent policy issues is related to a new technology: genetically 
modified (GM) agricultural products. One of the most striking observations is the difference in GM 
regulation between the US and the EU.   
Since the end of the 1990s, the EU has followed a precautionary approach in establishing new 
legislation to regulate GM technology. While for some time this led to a de facto EU moratorium on 
the approval of GM products both for imports and for domestic production. The restrictions on 
imports have been reduced since 2003, but the staunch opposition of consumers and anti-GM activist 
groups in combination with the institutional set-up of the EU’s decision-making procedure on 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) have led to something like a regulatory gridlock on GM 
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production in the EU (Swinnen and Vandemoortele 2010). 
One key difference between the EU and the US were the regulatory environments and 
attitudes. When GM emerged as a major policy issue the regulatory environment in Washington DC 
was dominated by the Reagan-era anti-regulation philosophy (Charles, 2001).  In contrast, in the EU 
the GM policy issues became most important when food safety crises of the 1990s contributed to a 
great weariness about new food technologies, including genetic modification (Swinnen et al, 2011). 
As explained elsewhere, the food safety crises had led to several policy initiatives to regulate the food 
chain. According to survey data (Eurobarometer 2010), EU consumers’ optimism about 
biotechnology was at an all-time low of 24 percent in 1999. It increased since to 77 percent in 2010 
(the highest ever),  but at the same time 58 percent of consumers still opposed GM food. 
A crucial element was the differential role played by various interest groups in the EU and the 
US.  Various groups have tried to influence policy making on GM: activist groups, farmers, biotech 
innovators, competing input suppliers (chemical companies), etc.  Graff, Hochman and Zilberman 
(2009) argue that the US agribusiness industry has been a much more pro-GM lobbying force than the 
EU agribusiness industry.  A key factor is that some of the most important GM products are 
effectively competing with the traditional agribusiness products.  This applies especially to GM traits 
which substitute for pesticides and insectides.  As a result many of the large agro-pharmaceutical 
companies, such as Bayer and BASF, were uncertain what side to take in the debate. GM opened up 
new avenues for profit and commercial avenues in the future, but at the same time potentially 
undermined their traditional profits. 
This was particularly the case in the EU.  In the US some of the key companies, both the new 
GM start-ups – most of who developed in the US – and large traditional agribusiness companies, in 
particular Monsanto, went all out lobbying for GMO. This created a very different political coalition 
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in the US than in the EU, contributing to a different regulatory outcome.  
Later in the process some of the European agribusiness companies seem to have changed their 
mind, with BASF introducing some new GM products.  However by that time the EU decision 
process was stuck in a policy gridlock.  As a result, BASF and other European companies have moved 
their GM research capacity and product development to non-EU countries, including the US.  
 
Food, Feed and … Fuel 
The late 2000s have witnessed a dramatic introduction of biofuels in agricultural and food 
markets and policy.  The dramatic increase in the use of food commodities (mostly corn in the USA 
and sugar in Brazil and) in the past decade had a major impact on global markets and on the food 
policy debate.   
The political and policy background to biofuels in the 1990s and early 2000s was very 
different than today’s.  With large crop surpluses and low agricultural prices, policymakers were 
looking for ways to support farmers without the burden of huge subsidies. Using crops for alternative 
uses was one method of removing such surpluses and boosting prices. At the same time, the Gulf War 
served as a reminder that countries needed to wean themselves from foreign crude oil sources. 
Increased recognition of climate change stemming from greenhouse gas emissions presented yet 
another rationale for moving away from fossil fuels. As a result, both the EU and the US stimulated 
the development of biofuels.  The growth of biofuels was much stronger in the US (mostly corn-based 
ethanol) than in the EU (mostly biodiesel). 
The US biofuels legislation was built on a history of tax exemptions and tariffs (taxes on 
imports), but the fundamental policy shift was the introduction of mandates for the use of biofuels in 
transportation—the Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) in 2005 (Lobell, Naylor and Field, 2014; 
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Naylor, 2012). The impacts of the US biofuels legislation was large. From 2004 to 2012, the amount 
of corn used for ethanol increased from about 1.2 billion bushels to about 5 billion bushels. Over 40 
percent of U.S. corn use now goes to ethanol. Corn acreage increased by almost one-third, mainly by 
the replacement of other crops and by taking land out of conservation reserves. Corn prices increased 
strongly during this period.  
After 2007, the policy climate on biofuel changed. The turnaround was triggered by two 
developments. First, while there is disagreement on the size of the impact, biofuels generally have 
been an important driver of increasing food prices, which spiked in 2007 and 2008 (de Gorter et al. 
2013). Second, biofuels were originally thought of as environmentally friendly fuels, due to their 
decreased carbon impact relative to fossil fuels. However, indirect effects on land use change (e.g., 
deforestation) may lead to an increase––rather than a decrease––in greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGE). These factors transformed the debate on biofuels. 
In response to the recent critiques on biofuels, the EU Commission (EC) proposed what the 
biofuels industry has described as a policy U-turn.  From encouraging this sector through production 
targets and blending mandates, the EC is now backtracking and seeks to minimize the use of food-
crop based biofuels. The new biofuel sustainability requirements of the 2009 Renewable Energy 
Directive try to limit the impact of biofuels on rising food prices (European Commission 2009). In 
2012, the EC published a proposal limiting the use of food-crop based biofuels at 5 per cent of 
consumption of energy for transport in 2020. However lobbying by various organizations with vested 
interest in biofuels and higher agricultural prices have led to a postponement of the decision. 
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Insuring Crops or the Insurance Industry? 
Agriculture has always been a risky business as a consequence of uncertain weather, prices, 
diseases, and pests.  Since 2000, however, US agricultural policy has significantly increased subsidies 
to use insurance instruments to help combat those risks. The crop insurance program is a public-
private partnership, in which the government pays half of the insurance premiums of farmers, and 
agrees also to underwrite some costs of the private insurance companies. Between 2005 and 2012, 
government budget costs for crop insurance rose sharply, and in 2012, about 90% of U.S. cropland 
was covered by the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP).  In addition to yield coverage, farmers 
can also purchase revenue-based insurance, which covers several dimensions of price variability.   
 Not surprisingly, the US insurance industry was an active participant in the discussions on the 
2014 Farm Bill. During the 2013 legislative process the insurance industry lobbied senators 
aggressively and outmanoeveured the advocates for reform, effectively maintaining support for the 
crop insurance program in the 2014 Farm Bill (Cuellar et al., 2014).    
 Interestingly, the EU Commission also considered proposing an insurance policy for including 
in the new CAP. They launched several studies on the issue but concluded that too much of the 
subsidies would end up with the insurance companies rather than farmers. In addition, the risk of 
creating new vested interest in future CAP policies through this new instrument reduced their 
enthusiasm for an agricultural insurance policy. In the light of the aggressive lobbying in the US by 
the insurance industry this seems like a realistic assessment. 
 
11.  Conclusions  
Political coalitions have changed over the past decades (and centuries) as economic 
development implies the relative decline of some sectors in the value chain and the (relative) growth 
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of others.  New technologies have introduced new players into the value chains and new policy 
instruments have provided incentives for others to join the lobbying game. 
In this paper I first  reviewed changes in the structure of the agri-food value chains and 
discussed conceptual reasons why such changes may affect the political coalitions and the resulting 
policy equilibria. I then reviewed a series of cases how changes in the political coalitions have 
affected policy outcomes, including historical changes in agricultural protection, the impact of 
changes in consumer interests in recent decades, changes in concentration in the downstream sectors 
of the value chains; the growth of environmental interests and emergence of new (bio-)technologies; 
the growth of biofuels and new policy instruments such as crop insurance subsidies.  In general each 
of these changes has had (sometimes very profound) impacts on agricultural and food policy 
decisions.   
The implication of our review is that studies which ignore the variety and heterogeneity of the 
actors involved in the value chains, may miss out on important political economy dynamics when 
interpreting the observed policy outcomes. 
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Box 1. A Simple Value Chain  
 
 
INPUT SUPPLIERS  
(incl COMPANIES PRODUCING SEEDS, FERTILIZERS, AGROCHEMICALS, 
RURAL CREDIT ORGANIZATIONS, LANDOWNERS, …) 
 
 
FARMS 
 
FOOD PROCESSORS 
 
RETAILERS 
 
CONSUMERS 
 
 
40 
 
 
Figure 1 : Share of agriculture in employment and GDP (%) 1900-2010 
 
1.a  Employment 
 
 
 
1.b GDP  
 
 
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, ILO and Swinnen (2009)  
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Figure 2 : Share of food in consumption expenditures (%) 1900-2010 
 
Source: Eurostat and Swinnen (2009) 
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Figure 3 : Share of Food Manufacturing and Retail in Gross Value Added and 
Employment in Selected European Countries (%) 1975 - 2013 
 
3.a: Share of food manufacturing in GVA  (%) 
 
 
3.b: Share of food manufacturing in employment (%) 
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3.c: Share of retail trade in GVA (%) 
 
 
 
3.d: Share of retail trade in employment (%) 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Figure 4: Government Support to Agriculture (NRA) in the EU * 
 
Source : Anderson and Nelgen (2013) and Swinnen (2009) 
 
* NRA  = Nominal Rate of Assistance, which is an indicator of government support to 
agriculture and is measured as the price of a product in the domestic market (plus any 
subsidy) less its price at the border, expressed as a percentage of the border price (adjusting 
for transport costs, quality differences etc). 
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